

A scalar analysis of polarity contrasts
between exclusive modifiers

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Exclusives

(1)

- a. My cat Gertrude **only** eats kibble.
- b. My cat Gertrude **just** eats kibble.
- c. My cat Gertrude **merely** eats kibble.
- d. My cat Gertrude **exclusively** eats kibble.
- e. My cat Gertrude **solely** eats kibble.

→ Gertrude eats kibble

→ Gertrude does not eat alternatives to kibble

... and negative polarity

(2)

- a. Gertrude only **ever** eats kibble.
- b. # Gertrude just **ever** eats kibble.
- c. # Gertrude merely **ever** eats kibble.
- d. # Gertrude exclusively **ever** eats kibble.
- e. # Gertrude solely **ever** eats kibble.

... and negative polarity

(3)

- a. I *only*(/just/merely/exclusively/solely) thought that Gertrude **ever** ate kibble, not caviar.
- b. I *only*(/just/merely/exclusively/solely) brought Gertrude to **any** of the cat shows.

Why does *only* license NPIs, but not the other exclusives?

Roadmap

All exclusives exclude alternatives, but they order the alternatives differently.

- *Only* licenses NPIs because it orders the alternatives by **entailment**.
- *Just* and *merely* order the alternatives by **rank**.
- *Exclusively* and *solely* don't order the alternatives at all

Excluding via entailment is necessary to license NPIs!

Exclusives

(4) Lexical entry schema for exclusives (Coppock & Beaver 2014)

- a. $\text{MIN}(p) = \lambda w. \exists q \in_{\text{co}} [q(w) \wedge q \geq p]$
- b. $\text{MAX}(p) = \lambda w. \forall q \in_{\text{co}} [q(w) \rightarrow p \geq q]$
- c. $[[\textit{only}]] = \lambda p \lambda w: \text{MIN}(p)(w). \text{MAX}(p)(w)$

Intended to unify **complement exclusion** and **scalar** readings.

Exclusives

Variation in the \geq relation results in different readings.


(5) Gertrude **only** eats kibble.

→ Gertrude eats nothing **other** than kibble. // *entailment*(\geq)


(6) Frederick is **just** a kitten.

→ Frederick is nothing **higher** than a kitten. // *rank*(\geq)

Entailment scales



Rank-order scales



Scalar ambiguity

Although, scale structure is not perfectly correlated with entailment: rank-order scales can still include atomic alternatives that entail each other (e.g. Horn scales)

- *<some, many, most, all>* is not a boolean lattice: there is no alternative *<some, all>* that excludes *most*

Scale structure \neq whether the alternatives entail each other \neq whether the ordering is specified as entailment.

How absolute are scalar restrictions?

- Horn (2000): *only* orders alternatives by entailment, *just* by rank.
- Coppock & Beaver (2014): exclusives have “soft preferences” for different scales.

Some exclusives are more flexible than others: *only* can have rank-order readings too, *exclusively* and *solely* cannot.

(7) Frederick is **only/#exclusively/#solely** a kitten.

NPIs disambiguate

(8) *Context: card game*

- a. I only/just/merely have a six. → Six is the **highest** card I have
- b. Since the game started, I've only/just/merely had a six. → I have had no **higher** card than a six
- c. Since the game started, I've only/#just/#merely **ever** had a six. → I have had no **other** card than a six

→ Evidence that NPIs require scales ordered by entailment.

NPIs

Chierchia (2013): NPIs are existential quantifiers associated with maximally wide domains, that trigger exhaustification over domain alternatives.

(9) $[[\text{ever}]] = \lambda e. \exists i \subset_{\text{ever}'} [\top(e) = i]$

(10)

- a. exh [Gertrude doesn't **ever** eat kibble.]
- b. $\# \text{exh}$ [Gertrude ever **eats** kibble.]

NPIs

$$(11) [[exh]] = \lambda p \lambda w. p(w) \wedge \forall q \in \text{ALT}(p) [{}^a q(w) \rightarrow {}^a p \geq {}^a q]$$

- Exhaustification is **scalar**: sensitive to the same orderings exclusives are.
- This allows a straightforward treatment of rank-order scales.

Proposal

- *Only* orders alternatives by **entailment**.
- *Just/merely* order alternatives by **rank**. (Horn was right!)
- *Exclusively/solely* aren't scalar and do not order the alternatives at all (like the Horn 1969 analysis of *only*).

Entries

(12)

- a. $[[\text{only}]] = \lambda p \lambda w : \text{MIN}(p)(w) . \text{MAX}(p)(w)$
- b. $[[\text{just/merely}]] = \lambda p \lambda w : \text{RANK}(\geq) \wedge \text{MIN}(p)(w) . \text{MAX}(p)(w)$
- c. $[[\text{exclusively/solely}]] = \lambda p \lambda w : p(w) . \forall q \in \text{ALT}(p) [p \neq q \rightarrow \neg q(w)]$

What are the alternatives?

- Exclusive's focus alternatives (F-ALT)
- NPI's domain alternatives (D-ALT)
- The propositional F-ALTS will also include NPIs, so we need to include the D-ALTS for each F-ALT too.

$$\text{ALT}(p) = \text{F-ALT}(p) \cup \text{D-ALT}(p) \cup \{\text{D-ALT}(q) \mid q \in \text{F-ALT}(p)\}$$

Orderings

The scalar exclusives (*only, just, merely*) impose the same ordering \geq on the entire ALT set.

- \geq = entailment: D-ALTs are ordered by entailment too
- \geq = rank: D-ALTs are ordered by rank

Orderings

... however, scalar exclusives (*only, just, merely*) only exclude the F-ALTS.

(13)

- a. $\text{MIN}(p) = \lambda w. \exists q \in_{\text{F-ALT}} [q(w) \wedge q \geq p]$
- b. $\text{MAX}(p) = \lambda w. \forall q \in_{\text{F-ALT}} [q(w) \rightarrow p \geq q]$

Exhaustification

Exh excludes alternatives to the MAX assertion with narrower D-ALTs.

$$(14) \text{ALT}(\text{MAX}(p)) = \{\text{MAX}(q) \mid q \in \text{D-ALT}(p)\}$$

Only ever

MAX reverses strength: if $q \rightarrow p$, then $\text{MAX}(p) \rightarrow \text{MAX}(q)$.

(15) $[[\text{exh}(\text{Gertrude only ever eats kibble})]]$

$= (\exists i \subseteq_{\text{ever}} [\text{T}(\mathbf{eat}(\mathbf{k})(\mathbf{g})) = i])(\lambda p \lambda w : \text{MIN}(p)(w). \text{MAX}(p)(w) \wedge$

$\forall q \in \text{ALT}(\text{MAX}(p))[q(w) \rightarrow (\text{MAX}(p) \rightarrow q)])]$

Only ever

(16)

- a. $ALT(p) = \{ \langle kibble, ever \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ caviar}, \cancel{ever} \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ chocolate}, \cancel{ever} \rangle, \langle kibble, sometimes \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ caviar}, \cancel{sometimes} \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ chocolate}, \cancel{sometimes} \rangle, \langle kibble, often \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ caviar}, \cancel{often} \rangle, \langle \cancel{kibble \ \& \ chocolate}, \cancel{often} \rangle \dots \}$
- b. $ALT(MAX(p)) = \{ MAX(\langle kibble, ever \rangle), MAX(\langle kibble, sometimes \rangle), MAX(\langle kibble, often \rangle) \dots \}$
- ✓ not a contradiction!

#just ever

MAX does not reverse strength: if $q \geq p$, then $\text{MAX}(q) \geq \text{MAX}(p)$. This means the narrower D-ALTs are still ranked higher than the prejacent.

(17) #[[*exh*(Gertrude just ever eats kibble)]]

$$\begin{aligned} &= (\exists i \subset_{\text{ever}} [\text{T}(\mathbf{eat}(\mathbf{k}))(\mathbf{g})) = i])(\lambda p \lambda w : \text{MIN}(p)(w). \text{MAX}(p)(w) \wedge \\ &\forall q \in_{\text{ALT}}(\text{MAX}(p))[q(w) \\ &\rightarrow \text{MAX}(p) \geq q]) \end{aligned}$$

#just ever

(18)

- a. $ALT(p) = \{ \langle kibble, ever \rangle, \langle \cancel{caviar}, \cancel{ever} \rangle, \langle \cancel{chocolate}, \cancel{ever} \rangle, \langle kibble, sometimes \rangle, \langle caviar, sometimes \rangle, \langle chocolate, sometimes \rangle, \langle kibble, often \rangle, \langle caviar, often \rangle, \langle chocolate, often \rangle \dots \}$
- b. $ALT(MAX(p)) = \{ MAX(\langle kibble, ever \rangle), MAX(\langle \cancel{kibble}, \cancel{sometimes} \rangle), MAX(\langle \cancel{kibble}, \cancel{often} \rangle) \dots \}$

X contradiction!

#solely ever

Not scalar: excludes the D-ALTs too.

$$(19) \#[[Gertrude solely ever eats kibble]] = (\exists i \in \text{ever}[\top(\mathbf{eat}(\mathbf{k})(\mathbf{g})) = i])(\lambda p \lambda w : \\ p(w). \forall q \in \text{ALT}(p)[p \neq q \rightarrow \neg q(w)])$$

#solely ever

(20) $ALT(p) = \{ \langle \text{kibble}, \text{ever} \rangle, \langle \text{caviar}, \text{ever} \rangle, \langle \text{chocolate}, \text{ever} \rangle, \langle \text{kibble}, \text{sometimes} \rangle, \langle \text{caviar}, \text{sometimes} \rangle, \langle \text{chocolate}, \text{sometimes} \rangle, \langle \text{kibble}, \text{often} \rangle, \langle \text{caviar}, \text{often} \rangle, \langle \text{chocolate}, \text{often} \rangle \dots \}$

X contradiction!

Strawson DE is preserved

Strawson DE (von Stechow 1999) = downward entailment, given the **presuppositions of the consequent**.

- **consequent** = D-ALTs for each excluded F-ALT are false
- **presuppositions** = prejacent's D-ALTs are true

Strawson DE is preserved

- *just/merely*: *exh* excludes the consequent
- *exclusively/solely* exclude the presuppositions of the consequent

✗ neither counts as Strawson DE.

Conclusions

NPIs need entailment scales.

- *Just/merely* order alternatives by rank rather than entailment, failing to reverse logical strength.
- *Exclusively/solely* exclude indiscriminately, canceling the NPI's D-ALTs too.

Conclusions

- We need stricter restrictions on how exclusives order the alternatives:
just/merely limited to rank, *exclusively/solely* not scalar.
- More broadly: at least sometimes, expressions that impose restrictions on alternatives can also affect other alternative-sensitive expressions in the same sentence.

Thanks!

Chierchia, Gennaro (2013). *Logic in grammar: polarity, free choice, and intervention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Coppock, Elizabeth and David Beaver (2014). “Principles of the exclusive muddle”. In: *Journal of Semantics* 31, pp. 371–432.

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Horn, Laurence (2000). “Pick a theory (not just any theory)”. In: *Negation and polarity: syntactic and semantic perspectives*. Ed. by Laurence Horn and Yasuhiko Kato. Oxford: Oxford University Press.